





We	 study	 the	 impact	 of	 loss-aversion	 and	 the	 threat	 of	 critical	 damages	 from	
insufficient	 pollutant	 abatement,	 which	we	 jointly	 call	 threshold	 concerns,	 on	 the	
outcome	 of	 international	 environmental	 agreements.	 We	 aim	 to	 understand	
whether	 concerns	 for	 a	 critical	 level	 of	 damages	 induce	 cooperation	 among	
countries	 faced	 with	 the	 well-known	 free-riding	 problem,	 and	 yield	 sufficient	
emission	reductions	to	avoid	exceeding	the	threshold.	Specifically,	we	focus	on	loss-
averse	countries	negotiating	under	 the	 threat	of	either	high	or	 low	environmental	
damages.	 Under	 symmetry,	when	 countries	 display	 identical	 degrees	 of	 threshold	
concern,	we	show	that	such	beliefs	have	a	positive	effect	on	reducing	the	emission	
levels	of	both	signatories	to	the	treaty	and	non-signatories,	leading	to	weakly	larger	
coalitions	 of	 signatories	 than	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 reference	 dependence.	 We	 then	
introduce	asymmetry,	by	allowing	countries	to	differ	in	the	degree	of	concern	about	
the	 damages.	We	 show	 that	 stable	 coalitions	 are	mostly	 formed	 by	 the	 countries	
with	 higher	 threshold	 concerns.	 When	 enough	 countries	 exhibit	 standard	
preferences,	the	coalition	size	may	diminish,	regardless	of	the	degree	of	concern	by	
the	others.	
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The	 theory	 of	 international	 environmental	 agreements	 (IEAs)	 has	 produced	 stark	
insights	 into	the	difficulties	of	achieving	cooperation.	Due	to	the	intrinsic	 trade-off	
between	 the	 breadth	 of	 the	 agreement,	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 number	 of	 acceding	
countries,	 and	 the	 depth	 of	 the	 abatement	 commitments,	 game	 theorists	 have	
postulated	that	self-enforcing	environmental	agreements	will	have	limited	success.	
Either	few	signatories	will	commit	to	stringent	targets,	or	many	countries	will	sign	
on	 to	 a	 shallow	 agreement	 that	 only	 achieves	 modest	 reductions	 (Barrett,	 1994;	
Carraro	and	Siniscalco,	1993;	d’Aspremont	et	 al.,	 1983;	Hoel,	1992).	The	 standard	
model	 has	 recently	 been	 extended	 to	 account	 for	 important	 empirical	 findings,	
including:	 introducing	 asymmetric	 countries	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 making	 side	
payments,	 relaxing	 rationality	 and	 perfect	 foresight	 assumptions	 ascribed	 to	
countries,	 and	 linkage	of	 cooperation	on	 IEAs	with	other	 issues	 such	as	 trade	and	
R&D	(for	reviews	of	this	literature,	see	Barrett,	2005,	and	Finus,	2008).	One	feature,	
which	is	common	to	virtually	all	IEA	literature,	is	that	reference	considerations	are	
absent	 from	 countries’	welfare	 functions.	 These	 depend	 only	 on	 absolute	 benefits	
and	costs	of	emissions,	in	a	continuous	fashion.		
In	economics	and	psychology,	the	concept	of	loss	aversion	has	recently	been	used	to	
account	 for	 the	 empirical	 finding	 that	 individuals	 place	 a	 higher	weight	 on	 losses	
than	 gains,	 violating	 the	 assumption	 of	 standard	 economic	 theory	 that	 tastes	 are	
unchanging	 (Kahneman,	 2003).	 Theories	 of	 loss	 aversion	 have	 sprung	 up	 with	
proposed	explanations	for	this	ubiquitous	phenomenon	(DellaVigna,	2009;	Barberis,	
2013).	Remarkably,	loss	aversion	has	not	been	used,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	in	
modeling	 environmental	 agreements.1	Given	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 reference	 point	
considerations	 in	 human	 decision-making,	 we	 investigate	 its	 role	 in	 affecting	 the	
																																																								
1	One	exception	is	İriş	(2016).	It	examines	the	implications	of	political	parties	being	averse	
to	 insufficient	 economic	 performance	 (relative	 to	 a	 critical	 economic	 target	 level)	 on	
sustaining	an	international	environmental	agreement	in	an	infinitely	repeated	game	setting.	




size	and	commitment	 level	of	 coalitions	cooperating	on	curbing	emission	 levels	 in	
the	 presence	 of	 loss	 aversion	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 threshold	 amount	 for	 acceptable	
environmental	damage.		
The	 literature	 on	 dangerous	 climate	 change	 has	 recently	 focused	 on	 boundary	
conditions,	which,	if	crossed,	may	trigger	quick	and	unavoidable	ecosystem	collapse	
(Scheffer	et	al.,	2001;	Lade	et	al.,	2013).	Rockström	and	colleagues	(Rockström	et	al.,	
2009)	 identified	 planetary	 boundaries	 that	 define	 “the	 safe	 operating	 space	 for	
humanity	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 Earth	 system	 and	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 planet’s	
biophysical	 subsystems	 or	 processes.”	 They	 suggest	 that	 the	 boundaries	 in	 three	
systems,	 including	 climate	 change	 (for	 which	 they	 propose	 to	 keep	 atmospheric	
carbon	 dioxide	 concentration	 below	 350	 parts	 per	 million	 and	 the	 change	 in	
radiative	 forcing	 below	 one	 watt	 per	 square	 meter),	 have	 already	 been	 crossed.	
Hence,	the	prospect	of	incurring	additional	losses	from	ecosystem	collapse	may	well	
enter	 into	 governments’	 considerations.	 This	 will	 be	 particularly	 likely	 for	
vulnerable	 developing	 countries	 with	 limited	 capability	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 changing	






calculus	 of	 net	 benefits	 from	 pollution.	 However,	 above	 a	 critical	 level	 of	 damage	
from	emissions,	additional	losses	will	ensue	according	to	a	multiplier	effect.		
In	 this	 paper	 we	 model	 threshold	 concerns	 by	 introducing	 a	 kink	 in	 the	 welfare	
function	 and	 allowing	 expectations	 about	 the	 damages	 to	 vary	 across	 countries.2	
Such	asymmetry	may	arise	 for	at	 least	 two	reasons,	both	of	which	are	compatible	
with	our	framework:	(1)	divergent	views	on	the	location	of	the	threshold,	possibly	




Dannenberg	 et	 al.,	 2017);	 (2)	 differing	 evaluations	 of	 the	 losses	 incurred	 when	
exceeding	 the	 threshold.	 One	 can	 think	 of	 (1)	 as	 rooted	 in	 scientific	 uncertainty	
about	 its	 location,	while	 the	 latter	 form	 of	 asymmetry	 can	 either	 be	 attributed	 to	
differences	in	the	capital	at	stake	(e.g.	due	to	higher	potential	physical	and	financial	
losses	from	climate	change	in	coastal	areas),	or	in	perceptions.		
Here	we	 concentrate	 on	 the	 latter	 behavioral	 interpretation,	 but	 remark	 that	 the	
findings	detailed	in	Section	3	do	not	hinge	on	it	and	apply	equally	well	to	the	other	





can	 recover	 the	 standard	 model	 without	 loss	 aversion	 by	 setting	 one	 parameter	
equal	to	zero,	as	discussed	below.		
For	tractability	reasons,	in	Section	2	we	abstract	from	the	complexities	arising	from	
asymmetries	 in	 exposure	 to	 the	 damages	 from	 high	 concentrations	 of	 pollutants,	
and	assume	that	countries	are	symmetric	and	agree	on	one	value	of	the	threshold,	
henceforth	T.	Introducing	uncertainty	on	its	location	can	destabilize	cooperation,	by	
removing	 the	 coordination	 equilibrium	 where	 (just)	 enough	 mitigation	 is	
undertaken	 to	 avoid	 steep	 losses.	 Under	 sufficiently	 large	 uncertainty,	 the	 game	
reverts	 to	 a	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 whose	 unique	 equilibrium	 is	 for	 all	 countries	 to	
eschew	mitigation	efforts	(Barrett,	2013).		
The	related	experimental	literature	on	the	provision	of	discrete	public	goods	subject	
to	 provision	 thresholds	 corroborates	 this	 result.3	It	 has	 been	 shown	 that	 both	
asymmetries	 among	 players,	 as	 well	 as	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 location	 of	 the	
threshold	hinder	group	achievement	as	measured	by	the	likelihood	of	avoidance	of	






engine	 of	 collective	 action,	 as	 successful	 experimental	 groups	 tend	 to	 eliminate	
inequality	over	 the	course	of	 the	game.	 In	 these,	 rich	players	 signal	willingness	 to	
redistribute	their	funds	early	on	in	the	game	(Tavoni	et	al.,	2011).	Related	empirical	
and	theoretical	studies	confirm	the	importance	of	leadership	(Bosetti	et	al.,	2017b;	





to	 bias	 upwards	 the	 transformative	 potential	 of	 the	 threshold	 in	 fostering	
cooperation.	 We	 check	 for	 this	 effect	 in	 Section	 3,	 which	 extends	 the	 model	 by	
introducing	 some	 degree	 of	 asymmetry	 in	 countries’	 threshold	 concerns.	 More	
specifically,	we	introduce	heterogeneous	beliefs	by	letting	a	fraction	of	the	countries	
perceive	the	critical	level	of	damages	to	be	higher	than	for	the	remaining	countries.4	
This	 asymmetry	 in	 countries’	 threshold	 concerns	 may	 also	 exist	 due	 to	
heterogeneous	beliefs	on	the	location	of	the	threshold.		
Under	 symmetric	 threshold	 concerns,	we	 show	 that	 the	 form	 of	 loss-aversion	we	
used	has	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 reducing	 the	 emission	 levels	 of	 both	 signatories	 and	
non-signatories,	leading	to	a	larger	coalition	in	some	cases.	Therefore,	countries	are	
more	 likely	 to	 take	 on	 significant	 environmental	 commitments	when	 they	 believe	
they	face	the	threat	of	critical	damages,	whose	consequences	would	be	felt	equally	
by	all	countries.		
Under	 asymmetric	 threshold	 concerns,	 stable	 coalitions	 are	mostly	 formed	by	 the	
countries	with	higher	threshold	concerns.	The	size	of	the	coalition	diminishes	when	









in	 some	cases,	 a	 coalition	may	not	 form;	 in	others,	more	 than	one	 stable	 coalition	
can	materialize.		
Our	 model	 closely	 follows	 and	 extends	 Diamantoudi	 and	 Sartzetakis	 (2006),	 DS,	
henceforth.	 In	 Section	 2,	 we	 introduce	 the	 basic	 notions	 of	 the	 model	 under	
symmetry.	We	begin	by	studying	two	benchmark	cases,	 the	games	associated	with	
non-cooperative	 behavior	 and	 full	 cooperation.	 We	 then	 introduce	 the	 coalition	
formation	game,	which	consists	of	non-signatory	behavior,	signatory	behavior,	and	
the	 stability	 analysis	 (to	 determine	 the	 size	 of	 the	 stable	 IEA).	 In	 Section	 3,	 we	
extend	 the	 model	 by	 allowing	 different	 countries	 to	 have	 differing	 degrees	 of	
aversion	 to	environmental	 losses.	Section	4	discusses	 the	 implications	of	 the	main	
findings.	
2.	Symmetric	Model	
We	 consider	 a	 regional	 or	 global	 pollution	 game	 involving	𝑛	identical	 countries,	
𝑁 = 1, 2,… ,𝑛 .	Production	and	consumption	in	each	country	𝑖	generates	emissions	
𝑒! 	of	 a	 transnational	 pollutant.	 Pollution	 is	 a	 public	 bad,	 that	 is,	 each	 country’s	
emission	 not	 only	 damages	 itself,	 but	 also	 damages	 other	 countries	 in	 equal	
measure,	 thus	 imposing	 a	 negative	 externality	 on	 others.	 We	 assume	 that	 each	
country	𝑖	simultaneously	 decides	 its	 non-negative	 emission	 level,	𝑒! ≥ 0.	5	By	 this	
assumption,	we	exclude	the	possibility	of	an	existing	stock	of	pollution	that	can	be	
diminished	 through	 abatement	 efforts.	 The	 standard	 social	welfare	 of	 country	𝑖	is	
the	 difference	 between	𝑖’s	 benefits	 from	 emissions	𝐵! 𝑒! 	due	 to	 production	 and	
consumption	 and	 the	 transboundary	 environmental	 damages	 𝐷! 𝐸 	from	 the	
aggregate	emissions,	𝐸 = 𝑒!!! .	We	use	the	following	quadratic	functional	forms	for	
the	objective	benefit	and	damage	functions:	
	 𝐵! 𝑒! = 𝛽𝑒! −
!
!
𝑒!!,		 and	 𝐷! 𝐸 =
!
!
𝐸!,	 	 	 (1)	
																																																								






That	 is,	 each	 country	𝑖	shares	 the	 same	 views	 on	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 critical	
threshold	𝑇 ≥ 0	representing	the	critical	level	of	damages.	Note	that	these	concerns	
are	based	on	country	representatives’	perceptions	(which	arguably	reflect	the	views	
and	 biases	 of	 their	 domestic	 constituency),	 and	 thus	 differ	 from	 the	 objective	
damages	in	(1).	If	the	level	of	environmental	damages	remains	below	the	threshold,	
i.e.,	𝐷! 𝐸 ≤ 𝑇,	then	each	country	𝑖	enjoys	being	within	the	critical	level	of	damages.	
If	 the	 level	of	environmental	damages	exceeds	 the	 threshold,	𝐷! 𝐸 > 𝑇,	 then	each	
country’s	 welfare	 drops	 due	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 sizeable	 damages.	 Specifically,	 we	
assume	 that	 governments	 are	 averse	 to	 environmental	 losses,	 i.e.,	 they	 have	 a	
stronger	tendency	to	avoid	the	environmental	 losses	generated	by	large	emissions	
than	acquiring	gains	(through	increased	emissions).		
Put	 differently,	 governments	 anticipate	 a	 certain	 outcome	 (in	 terms	 of	 damages	
from	 climate	 change),	 and	 any	deviation	 from	 this	 expected	 outcome	 is	 evaluated	
relative	 to	 the	 reference	point.	 From	 the	perspective	 of	 a	 loss-averse	 country,	 the	
marginal	 net	 benefit	 of	 emissions	 will	 be	 lower	 when	 the	 reference	 point	 is	
exceeded,	and	higher	when	damages	are	below	the	reference	point.		
The	environmental	gain-loss	function	of	country	𝑖	is	written	as	follows:	
	 	 𝐺𝐿! 𝐸,𝑇 =
𝑇 − 𝐷! 𝐸 , 𝐷! 𝐸 ≤ 𝑇
𝜆 𝑇 − 𝐷! 𝐸 , 𝐷!(𝐸) > 𝑇
		 	 	 (2)	
for	𝜆 > 1,	where	𝜆	is	known	as	a	loss-aversion	parameter.6		
Due	 to	 the	global	externality,	 the	social	welfare	of	a	 loss-averse	country	𝑖	depends	
on	its	own	emissions,	on	the	emissions	of	others,	𝑒!! = 𝑒!,… , 𝑒!!!, 𝑒!!!,… , 𝑒! ,	and	
also	 on	𝑇.	 The	 social	welfare	 of	 a	 loss-averse	 country	𝑖,	𝐵! 𝑒! − 𝐷! 𝐸 + 𝐺𝐿! 𝐸,𝑇 ,	
can	be	expressed	in	the	following	general	form:	
																																																								
6	This	 well-known	 formulation	 is	 a	 local	 definition	 of	 loss	 aversion	 by	 Köbberling	 and	
Wakker	(2005)	
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𝐿𝐸! + 𝐿 − 1 𝑇	 	 (3)	
where	𝐿	captures	threshold	concerns.	It	takes	different	values	in	the	following	three	
possible	cases:	
	 𝐿 𝐸 =
1, 𝑛𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑  (𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛)
1+ 𝛼, 𝐷(𝐸) ≤ 𝑇  (𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛)
1+ 𝛼𝜆, 𝐷(𝐸) > 𝑇 (𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛)
.	 	 (4)	
𝛼	is	 a	positive	 scaling	 factor,	measuring	 the	degree	 to	which	country	𝑖	cares	about	
the	environmental	gain-loss	function.	If	the	level	of	environmental	damages	exceeds	
𝑇,	 substituting	𝐿 = 1+ 𝛼𝜆 	in	 (3)	 results	 in	 the	 loss	 domain.	 The	 gain	 domain	
results	 instead	when	𝜆 = 1,	 implying	𝐿 = 1+ 𝛼 .	 Similarly,	 the	 neutral	 domain	 is	
recovered	by	equating	𝛼 = 0,	which	implies	𝐿 = 1.7		
Note	 that	 the	 threshold	T	disappears	once	 the	 first-order	 condition	 is	 taken.	Thus,	
once	the	domain	is	determined,	the	threshold	only	levies	the	social	welfare	level	but	
not	the	chosen	emission	levels.	
A	 loss-averse	 country’s	perceived	damage	 incorporates	 the	 gain-loss	 function	 into	
the	damage	function	and,	thus,	into	the	social	welfare	function.	As	shown	in	Figure	1,	
the	adjusted	environmental	damage	is	steeper	over	the	entire	domain,	compared	to	
the	 case	 without	 the	 gain-loss	 function.	 It	 always	 incentivizes	 countries	 to	 lower	
their	 emissions.	 However,	 it	 is	much	 steeper	 in	 the	 loss	 domain	 than	 in	 the	 gain	
domain,	 owing	 to	 the	 kink	 caused	 by	 the	 loss-aversion	 parameter	𝜆 > 1 at	 the	
threshold.	
																																																								
7 	For	 some	 parameter	 values,	 country	 𝑖 ’s	 equilibrium	 emissions	 in	 the	 loss	 domain	
(𝐿 = 1 + 𝛼𝜆)	may	 yield	 damages	 below	 the	 threshold,	 thus	 suggesting	 that	 country	𝑖	is	 in	
the	gain	domain.	On	 the	other	hand,	 country	𝑖’s	equilibrium	emissions	 in	 the	gain	domain	







Note:	 The	 loss-averse	 countries’	 perceived	 damage	 function	 (in	 red)	 is	 given	 by	 the	 difference	
between	 the	damage	 and	gain-loss	 functions	 (the	damage	 function	 enters	negatively	 and	 the	 gain-
loss	function	enters	positively	into	the	social	welfare).	The	loss-averse	countries’	perceived	damage	





countries	pursue	 their	unilateral	 strategies.	Given	 the	emission	 levels	of	 the	other	
countries,	 each	 country	 chooses	 its	 emission	 level	 to	maximize	 the	 social	welfare	
function	 described	 in	 (4).	 In	 the	 full	 cooperation	 case,	 all	 countries	 choose	 how	
much	 to	 jointly	 emit	 to	 maximize	 their	 aggregate	 social	 welfare	 function,		


































+ 𝐿 − 1 𝑇	
While	both	non-cooperative	and	cooperative	emission	levels,	𝑒!" 	and	𝑒! ,	decrease	in	
countries’	threshold	concerns,	as	expected	by	embedding	the	gain-loss	function	into	
the	social	welfare,	 the	drop	in	emissions	does	not	necessarily	 imply	an	 increase	 in	





The	 coalition	 formation	 game	 consists	 of	 three	 stages	 that	 are	 solved	 under	 the	
assumption	 that	 countries	 can	 look	 forward	 and	 infer	 backwards.	 Stage	 1	 is	 a	
participation	game	in	which	each	country	chooses	to	be	either	a	signatory	or	a	non-
signatory	to	a	stylized	IEA.	Stages	2	and	3	entail	a	Stackelberg	game	with	signatories	
playing	 the	 role	 of	 leaders.	 More	 specifically,	 the	 signatories	 jointly	 decide	 their	
emission	 levels	 in	 Stage	 2,	 followed	 by	 non-signatory	 countries	 independently	
deciding	 their	 emission	 levels	 in	 Stage	 3.	 The	 game	 is	 solved	 using	 backward	
induction.	
A	set	of	countries	𝑆 ⊂ 𝑁	signs	an	agreement,	while	the	remaining	N\S	countries	do	





member	 emitting	𝑒!	such	 that	𝐸! = 𝑠𝑒!.	 Each	 non-signatory	 emits	𝑒!",	 so	 that	 non-
signatories	collectively	emit	𝐸!" = 𝑛 − 𝑠 𝑒!".	
Non-signatories	are	Stackelberg	followers:	their	behavior	is	described	by	the	same	
best-response	 function	 as	 in	 the	 non-cooperative	 model	 (5).	 Signatories	 are	 the	
Stackelberg	leaders:	they	maximize	the	objective	function,	𝑤! = 𝑤!!∈! ,	by	solving	




i. Best-response:	𝑒!" 𝑒! =
!!!"#!!
!
,		 where	𝑋 = 1+ 𝛾𝐿 𝑛 − 𝑠 	












𝛾𝐿 1+ 𝛾𝐿 𝑛!𝑋!
2Ψ! + 𝐿 − 1 𝑇	
• Signatories:		









2Ψ + 𝐿 − 1 𝑇	
• Aggregate:	





countries,	 𝑛 − 𝑠 − 1 𝑒!" + 𝑠𝑒!,	 where,	 by	 symmetry,	 each	 non-signatory	 and	 also	
each	signatory	country	emit	the	same	level	in	equilibrium,	𝑒!"	and	𝑒!	respectively.		
Note	 that	 we	 must	 restrict	 the	 parameters	 to	 guarantee	 that	 signatory	 and	 non-
signatory	emissions	are	positive,	as	there	is	no	stock	of	emissions	in	the	model.	We	
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further	 restrict	 the	 parameters	 for	 emissions	 level	 to	 be	 higher	 for	 non-signatory	
countries	than	for	signatories.	
Proposition	1	(Conditions	on	emission	levels):		








iii. 𝑒!" > 0 ⇐ 𝛾 <
!
! ! (!!!)
	for	𝑛 >  4	
	These	conditions	require	the	relative	impact	of	damages	to	benefits	to	be	not	very	
high.	 Having	 non-trivial	 threshold	 concerns	 (that	 is,	 departing	 from	 the	 standard	
model	 of	 loss	 neutrality,	 with	𝐿 > 1)	 additionally	 requires	 the	 relative	 impact	 of	
damages	to	be	smaller.	This	condition	plays	an	essential	role	on	restricting	the	size	
of	the	stable	coalition	to	be	2, 3,	or	4	(see	more	on	DS,	pp.253).	
The	 following	Lemma,	adapted	 from	Proposition	2	 in	DS,	defines	 the	properties	of	
indirect	welfare	functions.		






i. 𝑧!"# = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛!∈ℝ∩ !,! 𝜔!;	
ii. 𝜔! 𝑠 	increases	in	𝑠	if	𝑠 > 𝑧!"#	and	it	decreases	in	s	if	𝑠 < 𝑧!"#;	
iii. 𝜔!" 𝑠 > 𝜔! 𝑠 	for	all	𝑠 > 𝑧!"#	and	𝜔!" 𝑠 < 𝜔! 𝑠 	for	all	𝑠 < 𝑧!"#;	
iv. If,	moreover,	𝑧!"#	is	an	integer,	then	the	two	indirect	welfare	levels	are	equal	
at	𝑠 = 𝑧!"#,	that	is,	𝜔!" 𝑧!"# = 𝜔! 𝑧!"# .	
Lemma	2	shows	that	a	country	is	better	off	as	a	signatory	by	more	countries	joining	




Proposition	 3	 (Accession	 under	 different	 threshold	 concerns):	 Let	𝐿’	and	𝐿’’	
represent	two	different	threshold	concerns	where	𝐿!! > 𝐿′,	then	
i. 𝑧!"# 𝐿′′ > 𝑧!"# 𝐿′ 	for	𝑛 > 1.	
ii. For	 all	 𝑠 ∈ 𝑧!"# 𝐿′ , 𝑧!"# 𝐿′′ ,	 𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!! 	increases	 in	 s	 and	
𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!!! 	decreases	 in	 s . 	For	 any	 other	𝑠 ∉ 𝑧!"# 𝐿′ , 𝑧!"# 𝐿′′ ,	 if	
𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!! 	decreases	(increases),	𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!!! 	decreases	(increases).	
iii. For	 all	 𝑠 ∈ 𝑧!"# 𝐿′ , 𝑧!"# 𝐿′′ ,	 𝜔!" 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!!  > 𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!! 	and	
𝜔!" 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!!! < 𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!!! .	
The	main	finding	of	Proposition	3	is	that	there	are	some	coalition	sizes	such	that	a	






number	 of	 signatories	𝑠∗	in	 a	 stable	 coalition.	 A	 coalition	 is	 stable	 if	 it	 satisfies	
internal	 and	 external	 stability	 conditions,	 which	 guarantee	 that	 the	 agreement	 is	
self-enforcing.	The	conditions	are,	respectively:	
	 	 𝜔! 𝑠∗ ≥ 𝜔!" 𝑠∗ − 1 	and	 𝜔! 𝑠∗ + 1 ≤ 𝜔!" 𝑠∗ .	 	 (6)	
The	internal	stability	condition	guarantees	that	a	signatory	country	cannot	be	better	
off	 by	 unilaterally	 leaving	 the	 coalition.	 Similarly,	 the	 external	 stability	 condition	
guarantees	that	a	non-signatory	country	cannot	be	better	off	by	unilaterally	joining	
the	coalition.10		
The	existence	and	uniqueness	of	a	 stable	coalition	 for	 the	social	welfare	 functions	
with	the	additional	gain-loss	function	follows	DS’s	Proposition	3.	More	specifically,	
																																																								
10	The	 conditions	 (6)	 are	 first	 used	 for	 cartel	 stability	 by	 d’Aspremont	 et	 al.	 (1983),	 then	
adapted	 to	 international	 public	 goods	 cooperation	 by	 Barrett	 (1992,	 1994),	 Hoel	 (1992),	
and	Carraro	and	Siniscalco	(1993).	
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as	 DS	 show,	 for	𝑛 > 4,	 there	 exists	 a	 unique	 stable	 coalition	 whose	 size	 is	𝑠∗ ∈
2,3,4 .	Next,	we	analyze	how	a	change	in	countries’	threshold	concerns	affects	the	
stable	coalition	size.	
Proposition	4	(Effect	of	L	on	the	stable	coalition	size):	For	𝑛 > 4,	𝜕𝑠∗ 𝜕𝐿 ≥ 0.		
Proposition	 4	 is	 the	main	 finding	 of	 the	 symmetric	model,	 namely	 that	 the	 stable	
coalition	size	weakly	increases	with	threshold	concern.	In	Appendix	2	we	illustrate	
this	 finding	 with	 a	 numerical	 example	 in	 which	 the	 size	 of	 the	 stable	 coalition	
increases	from	2	to	3.		
3.	Asymmetric	Model	
In	 this	 section,	we	 introduce	heterogeneity	 in	perceptions.	Namely,	 as	depicted	 in	
Figure	 2,	 out	 of	𝑛	countries,	ℎ	have	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 concern	 for	 exceeding	 the	
threshold	 T	 and	 𝑛 − ℎ 	have	 low	 (or	 no)	 threshold	 concerns,		
𝐿! > 𝐿! .	Alternatively,	as	depicted	in	Figure	3,	all	countries	share	the	same	level	of	
threshold	concerns	𝐿,	but	they	have	divergent	views	on	the	location	of	the	threshold	
T:	ℎ	countries	 believe	 the	 threshold	 is	 low	 and	𝑛 − ℎ	countries	 believe	 it	 is	 high,	
𝑇! ≤ 𝑇! .	Therefore,	ℎ	countries	are	in	the	loss	domain,	and	𝑛 − ℎ	countries	are	either	
in	 the	 gain	 (or	 neutral)	 domain.	 Both	 interpretations	 are	 compatible	 because	 the	
only	 role	played	by	𝑇	(or	𝑇! 	and	𝑇!)	 in	 the	model	 is	 to	determine	 in	which	domain	











2  𝐿! 𝑒!! + ℎ − 1 𝑒! + 𝑛 − ℎ 𝑒!  
! +  𝐿! − 1 𝑇;	



































𝐷(∙) –  𝐺𝐿(∙,𝑇!)  
𝐷(∙)–  𝐺𝐿!(∙,𝑇) 
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where	𝑒!! 	and	𝑒!" 	are	 the	 emission	 levels	 of	 country	𝑖,	 and	𝑒!	and	𝑒! 	are	 any	 other	
country’s	 emission	 levels	 with	 high	 and	 low	 threshold	 concerns.	 In	 the	 full	
cooperation	 case,	 both	 types	 of	 countries	 jointly	 decide	 their	 emission	 levels	 to	





𝑒!! ℎ − 1 𝑒! + 𝑛 − ℎ 𝑒! =
𝛽 − 𝛾𝐿! ℎ − 1 𝑒! + 𝑛 − ℎ 𝑒!  
1+ 𝛾𝐿!
 
𝑒!" ℎ𝑒! + 𝑛 − ℎ − 1 𝑒! =
𝛽 − 𝛾𝐿! ℎ𝑒! + 𝑛 − ℎ − 1 𝑒!  
1+ 𝛾𝐿!
 
ii. Best-responses under 𝑒!! = 𝑒!	and	𝑒!" = 𝑒! 	for	any	country	𝑖,	with	high	
and	low	threshold	concerns:	
𝑒! 𝑛 − ℎ 𝑒! =





1+ 𝛾𝐿! 𝑛 − ℎ
 
iii. Equilibrium emission levels with high and low threshold concerns: 
𝑒!!" = 𝛽
1− 𝛾 𝑛 − ℎ 𝐿! − 𝐿!
1+ 𝛾 ℎ𝐿! + 𝑛 − ℎ 𝐿!
< 𝛽
1+ 𝛾ℎ 𝐿! − 𝐿!
1+ 𝛾 ℎ𝐿! + 𝑛 − ℎ 𝐿!
= 𝑒!!" 





v. Equilibrium emission levels with high and low threshold concerns: 
𝑒!! = 𝑒!! =
𝛽
1+ 𝛾𝑛 ℎ𝐿! + 𝑛 − ℎ 𝐿!
 
vi. 𝑒!! = 𝑒!! < 𝑒!!" ⟺ 𝛾 <
(!!!)!!! !!! !!
!!!! !!! !! !!!!! !!!
 
Notice	that	the	denominators	of	both	emission	levels	in	(iii)	are	the	same.	Then,	it	is	
straightforward	 to	 observe	 that	 countries	with	 high	 threshold	 concerns	 emit	 less	
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than	 the	 ones	 with	 low	 threshold	 concerns	 in	 the	 non-cooperative	 solution:	
𝑒!!" < 𝑒!!" .		
Under	 full	cooperation,	both	types	of	countries	emit	 the	same	emission	 levels.	 (iv)	
and	 (vi)	 are	 similar	 to	Proposition	1	 (iii).	They	additionally	 require	 the	difference	
between	 high	 and	 low	 threshold	 concerns	 to	 be	 limited	 for	𝑒!!" > 0 	and	 for	
𝑒!!" > 𝑒!! = 𝑒!! .	
3.2.	Partial	Cooperation	
We	are	now	going	to	study	a	similar	coalition	formation	game	to	the	one	in	section	
2.2,	 by	 solving	 the	 asymmetric	 participation	 game	 so	 as	 to	 derive	 the	 number	 of	
signatories.	 Both	 countries	 with	 high	 and	 low	 threshold	 concerns	 can	 now	 be	
signatories	 to	 the	 treaty,	 and	 we	 denote	 them	 respectively	 by	𝑠! 	and	𝑠! ,	 with	
𝑠 = 𝑠! + 𝑠! .	That	means	the	numbers	of	non-signatories	with	high	and	low	threshold	
concerns	 are	 respectively	ℎ − 𝑠!	and	𝑛 − ℎ − 𝑠! .	 We	 denote	 the	 emission	 levels	 of	
signatories	and	non-signatories	with	high	 (𝐿!)	and	 low	(𝐿!)	 threshold	concerns	as	
𝑒!! ,	𝑒!" ,	𝑒!"!	and	𝑒!"# ,	respectively.	Proposition	6	summarizes	the	results	for	the	case	
of	partial	cooperation:	




𝑒!"!! 𝑒!! , 𝑒!" , 𝑒!"! , 𝑒!"#
=
𝛽 − 𝛾𝐿! 𝑛 − ℎ − 𝑠! 𝑒!"# + ℎ − 𝑠! − 1 𝑒!"! + 𝑠!𝑒!! + 𝑠!𝑒!"
1+ 𝛾𝐿!
	
ii. 𝑒!"!! = 𝑒!"!	and	𝑒!"#$ = 𝑒!"# 	for	any	country	𝑖:	
𝑒!"! 𝑒!! , 𝑒!" , 𝑒!"# =
𝛽 − 𝛾𝐿! 𝑛 − ℎ − 𝑠! 𝑒!"# + 𝑠!𝑒!! + 𝑠!𝑒!"
1+ 𝛾𝐿! ℎ − 𝑠!
 
𝑒!"# 𝑒!! , 𝑒!" , 𝑒!"! =
𝛽 − 𝛾𝐿! ℎ − 𝑠! 𝑒!"! + 𝑠!𝑒!! + 𝑠!𝑒!"




𝑒!"! 𝑒!! , 𝑒!" =
𝛽 − 𝛾𝐿! 𝑠!𝑒!! + 𝑠!𝑒!" − 𝛽𝛾 𝑛 − ℎ − 𝑠! 𝐿! − 𝐿!
𝑌 	




𝛽𝑌! − 𝛾 𝛽 𝑛 − 𝑠! − 𝑠! + 𝑠!𝑒!" 𝑠!𝐿! + 𝑠!𝐿!
𝑌! + 𝛾𝑠! 𝑠!𝐿! + 𝑠!𝐿!
 
𝑒!" 𝑒!! =
𝛽𝑌! − 𝛾 𝛽 𝑛 − 𝑠! − 𝑠! + 𝑠!𝑒!! 𝑠!𝐿! + 𝑠!𝐿!
𝑌! + 𝛾𝑠! 𝑠!𝐿! + 𝑠!𝐿!
	
v. Since	signatories	decide	simultaneously:	
𝑒!! = 𝑒!" =
! !!!" !!!!!!!!!
!







vii. 𝑒!! = 𝑒!" < 𝑒!"! ⇐ 𝛾 <
!!!! !!!!!!!
!!!! !!! !!!!!! !!!!
	
𝑒!! = 𝑒!" > 0 ⇐ 𝛾 <
1
𝑠!𝐿! + 𝑠!𝐿! 𝑛 − ℎ − 𝑠!
	
viii. Aggregate	emissions,	𝐸! = 𝐸!! + 𝐸!" + 𝐸!"! + 𝐸!"#:	





𝜔!! =  𝛽!
1
2−
𝛾𝑛! 𝑌!𝐿! + 𝛾 𝑠!𝐿! + 𝑠!𝐿!




𝛾𝑛! 𝑌!𝐿! + 𝛾 𝑠!𝐿! + 𝑠!𝐿!










2Ω! + 𝐿! − 1 𝑇	
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3.3.	Stability	Analysis		
In	 our	 asymmetric	model,	 a	 coalition	 is	 stable	 if	 it	 satisfies	 internal	 and	 external	
stability	conditions	for	countries	with	high	and	low	threshold	concerns:	
𝜔!! 𝑠!∗ , 𝑠!∗, ℎ,𝑛 ≥ 𝜔!"! 𝑠!∗ − 1, 𝑠!∗, ℎ,𝑛 ,	𝜔!! 𝑠!∗ + 1, 𝑠!∗, ℎ,𝑛 ≤ 𝜔!"! 𝑠!∗ , 𝑠!∗, ℎ,𝑛 ;	(8)	
𝜔!" 𝑠!∗ , 𝑠!∗, ℎ,𝑛 ≥ 𝜔!"# 𝑠!∗ , 𝑠!∗ − 1, ℎ,𝑛 ,	𝜔!" 𝑠!∗ , 𝑠!∗ + 1, ℎ,𝑛 ≤ 𝜔!"# 𝑠!∗ , 𝑠!∗, ℎ,𝑛 .		(9)	
Due	to	the	asymmetry,	these	conditions	depend	on	the	number	of	signatories	with	
high	 and	 low	 threshold	 concerns:	𝑠!∗ 	and	𝑠!∗,	 and	 their	 sum	 yield	 the	 stable	 size	 of	
coalition.	 This	 requires	 all	 four	 conditions	 to	 be	 satisfied.	 For	 instance,	 given	 a	
number	of	signatory	countries	with	low	threshold	concerns	𝑠!!,	the	stable	number	of	
countries	with	high	threshold	concerns	can	be	𝑠!!.	However,	given	𝑠!!,	𝑠!!	might	not	
be	 a	 stable	 number	 of	 countries	 with	 low	 threshold	 concerns.	 Moreover,	 these	




stable	 number	 of	 signatories	 with	 different	 levels	 of	 threshold	 concerns.	 In	 each	
table,	 the	 four	 rows	 show	 the	 number	 signatory	 countries	 with	 low	 threshold	
concerns	𝑠! ∈ 0,1,2,3 .	Similarly,	the	columns	show	the	number	signatory	countries	
with	 high	 threshold	 concerns	𝑠! ∈ 0,1,2,3 .	 Columns	 are	 grouped	 by	 different	
number	 of	 countries	with	 high	 threshold	 concerns	ℎ ∈ 0,1,… ,10 .	 The	 unfeasible	
columns	are	omitted,	since	for	any	ℎ,	we	have	𝑠! ≤ ℎ.		
For	 each	 column,	𝑠!	equals	 0,	 1,	 2,	 or	 3;	 the	 conditions	 in	 (9)	 provide	 a	 stable	
number	of	signatories	with	low	threshold	concerns	𝑠!∗,	and	we	mark	the	respective	
cell	 with	 “𝑙.”	 Similarly,	 for	 each	 row,	𝑠! 	equals	 0,	 1,	 2,	 or	 3;	 the	 conditions	 in	 (8)	
provide	 a	 stable	 number	 of	 signatories	 with	 high	 threshold	 concerns	𝑠!∗ ,	 and	 we	
mark	the	respective	cell	with	“ℎ.”	If	one	cell	contains	both	“h”	and	“l,”	then	it	shows	
how	 many	 signatories	 with	 high	 and	 low	 threshold	 concerns	 form	 this	 stable	
coalition.	
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In	 this	 numerical	 example,	 we	 assume	𝑛 = 10,	𝛽 = 5/3,	 and	𝛾 = 0.03333333332.	
The	 conditions	 on	 positive	 emissions	 and	 signatories	 emitting	 less	 than	 non-
signatories	 are	 satisfied,	 i.e.,	0 < 𝑒!! = 𝑒!" < 𝑒!"! < 𝑒!!" 	for	 all	 scenarios	 described	
below.		
Table	1:	Stable	Number	of	Signatories	with	High	(𝑳𝒉 = 𝟐)	and	Low	(𝑳𝒍 = 𝟏.𝟓)	Threshold	
Concerns	
	 h=0	 h=1	 h=2	 h=3	 h=4,	5	 h=6	 h≥7	
sl/sh	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1	 2	 0	 1	 2	 3	 0	 1	 2	 3	 0	 1	 2	 3	 0	 1	 2	 3	
0	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 l	 hl	 	 	 l	 hl	 	 l	 l	 hl	 l	 l	 l	 hl	
1	 	 	 	 	 	 h	 	 	 h	 	 	 l	 h	 	 	 	 h	 	 	 	 h	 	
2	 	 	 hl	 	 hl	 	 	 hl	 	 	 	 h	 	 	 l	 h	 	 	 	 h	 	 	
3	 l	 l	 h	 l	 h	 	 l	 h	 	 	 l	 h	 	 	 	 h	 	 	 	 h	 	 	
Note:	shaded	areas	indicate	the	stable	coalitions	and	the	number	of	signatories	with	high	and	low	
threshold	concerns	
In	Table	1,	we	assume	𝐿! = 2	and	𝐿! = 1.5.	This	is	a	scenario	in	which	both	types	of	
countries	have	significant	threshold	concerns	but	one	group	has	stronger	concerns	
than	the	other.	Several	interesting	findings	are	worth	noting.	First,	for	any	h,	the	size	
of	 the	 stable	 coalitions	 is	𝑠!∗ + 𝑠!∗ = 3.	 Second,	 for	ℎ ≥ 4,	 the	 stable	 coalition	 only	
consists	of	countries	with	high	threshold	concerns,	 𝑠!∗ , 𝑠!∗ = 3, 0 .	Third,	for	ℎ = 3,	
two	 stable	 coalitions	 exist,	 𝑠!∗ , 𝑠!∗ ∈ 3, 0 , 1, 2 .	 Fourth,	 for	ℎ ∈ 1, 2, 3 ,	 two	




Table	2:	Stable	Number	of	Signatories	with	High	(𝑳𝒉 = 𝟐)	and	No	(𝑳𝒍 = 𝟏)	Threshold	Concerns	
	 h=0	 h=1	 h=2,	3	 h≥4	
sl/sh	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1	 2	 3	 0	 1	 2	 3	
0	 	 	 l	 	 l	 hl	 	 	 l	 l	 hl	
1	 	 	 	 	 	 h	 	 	 	 h	 	
2	 l	 	 	 	 	 h	 	 	 	 h	 	
3	 	 l	 h	 l	 	 h	 	 l	 	 h	 	
Note:	shaded	areas	indicate	the	stable	coalitions	and	the	number	of	signatories	with	high	and	low	
threshold	concerns	
In	 Table	 2	 we	 assume	𝐿! = 2	and	𝐿! = 1.	 This	 is	 a	 scenario	 in	 which	 one	 type	 of	
country	has	significant	threshold	concerns,	but	the	other	has	none.	Compared	to	the	
case	presented	 in	Table	1,	 the	asymmetry	between	these	two	types	of	countries	 is	
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much	 more	 severe,	 leading	 to	 the	 following	 findings.	 First,	 for	ℎ ≤ 3,	 the	 size	 of	
stable	 coalitions	𝑠!∗ + 𝑠!∗ = 2.	 Second,	 countries	 with	 low	 threshold	 concerns	 have	
weaker	 incentives	 to	 participate	 in	 any	 coalition,	 due	 to	 stronger	 external	 effects.	
Countries	with	high	threshold	concerns	have	stronger	 incentives	 to	participate	 for	
ℎ ≥ 4,	and	also	if	some	countries	with	low	threshold	concerns	participate.	However,	
for	ℎ ≤ 3	and	𝑠! = 0,	 they	 have	 weaker	 incentives	 as	 well.	 Third,	 observe	 that	 a	
stable	coalition	may	not	exist.	
Table	3:	Stable	Number	of	Signatories	with	Mild	(𝑳𝒉 = 𝟏.𝟏)	and	No	(𝑳𝒍 = 𝟏)	Threshold	
Concerns	
	 h=0	 h=1	 h=2,	3	 h=4,	5,	6,	7	 h≥8	
sl/sh	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1	 2	 3	 0	 1	 2	 3	 0	 1	 2	 3	
0	 	 	 	 	 	 hl	 l	 	 	 hl	 l	 	 	 l	 hl	
1	 	 	 l	 	 l	 h	 	 	 l	 h	 	 	 l	 h	 	
2	 l	 l	 h	 l	 h	 	 	 	 h	 	 	 	 h	 	 	
3	 	 h	 	 h	 	 	 	 hl	 	 	 	 hl	 	 	 	
Note:	shaded	areas	indicate	the	stable	coalitions	and	the	number	of	signatories	with	high	and	low	
threshold	concerns	
In	Table	3,	we	assume	that	𝐿! = 1.1	and	𝐿! = 1.	This	is	a	scenario	in	which	one	type	
of	country	has	mild	threshold	concerns,	but	the	other	has	none.	Note	also	that	this	
case	 has	 the	 weakest	 asymmetry	 between	 two	 types	 of	 countries,	 leading	 to	 the	
following	findings.	First,	compared	to	the	case	presented	by	Table	2,	countries	with	
no	 threshold	 concerns	 (𝐿! = 1)	 have	 stronger	 incentives	 to	 participate,	 because	
weaker	asymmetry	between	types	implies	weaker	external	effects.	Second,	observe	
again	 the	multiplicity	and	potential	non-existence	of	 stable	 coalitions.	We	observe	
the	multiplicity	 of	 stable	 coalitions	 even	 if	 there	 is	 an	 equal	 number	 of	 countries	
with	high	and	low	threshold	concerns,	ℎ = 𝑛 − ℎ = 5.		
In	sum,	we	observe	that	countries	with	higher	threshold	concerns	tend	to	form	most	
of	the	coalitions.	However,	countries	with	low	threshold	concerns	may	also	join	the	









In	 ecological	 processes,	 threshold	 uncertainty	 is	 often	 irreducible;	 nevertheless,	
scientists	 attach	 probabilities	 to	 different	 future	 environmental	 scenarios.	 For	
example,	 the	 2013	 Intergovernmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change’s	 Summary	 for	
Policymakers	 (IPCC,	 2013)	 states	 that:	 “There	 is	 high	 confidence	 that	 sustained	
warming	greater	 than	some	threshold	would	 lead	to	 the	near-complete	 loss	of	 the	
Greenland	ice	sheet	over	a	millennium	or	more,	causing	a	global	mean	sea	level	rise	
of	up	to	7	m.	Current	estimates	indicate	that	the	threshold	is	greater	than	about	1°C	
(low	 confidence)	 but	 less	 than	 about	 4°C	 (medium	 confidence)	 global	 mean	
warming	with	respect	to	pre-industrial.”	Hence,	early	warning	signals,	 if	picked	up	
and	 correctly	 processed	 in	 time,	 may	 act	 as	 stimuli	 for	 action	 on	 environmental	
protection.	
We	 investigate	 theoretically	 this	 hypothesis	 by	 introducing	 aversion	 to	 losses	 in	
excess	of	 the	given	threshold	T,	which	can	be	viewed	as	reflecting	the	scientific	or	
political	consensus	on	what	level	of	environmental	damage	is	deemed	tolerable.		
While	 we	 do	 away	 with	 the	 complexities	 arising	 from	 explicitly	 modeling	 how	
uncertainty	muddles	the	value	of	the	threshold,	our	framework	allows	for	divergent	
views	 on	 its	 location,	 which	may	 arise	 due	 to	 scientific	 or	 political	 disagreement	
among	the	experts	or	the	negotiators	(Bosetti	et	al.,	2017a,	Dannenberg	et	al.,	2017).	
Under	this	interpretation,	countries	disagree	because	of	scientific	uncertainty	about	
the	 location	 of	 the	 threshold,	 or	 because	 of	 the	 difficulty	 in	 translating	 a	 given	
threshold	into	the	effort	required	to	avoid	overstepping	such	a	boundary,	as	argued	
in	 Barrett	 (2013).	 Alternatively,	 countries	 may	 have	 different	 evaluations	 of	 the	
losses	incurred	when	in	the	“danger	zone”.	The	asymmetric	behavior	modelled	here	






(Barrett,	 1994;	 Carraro	 and	 Siniscalco,	 1993).	 Specifically,	we	 study	 the	 impact	 of	
loss-aversion	 and	 reference	 dependence	 on	 the	 breadth	 and	 stability	 of	 an	
international	environmental	agreement	aimed	at	abating	emissions	in	the	presence	
of	 the	 threat	of	dangerous	climate	change.	We	model	 it	as	a	 (perceived)	 threshold	




represents.	 Hence,	 heterogeneity	 arises	 only	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 number	 of	
countries	signing	up	to	an	IEA	in	this	setting.	We	then	extend	the	model	to	allow	for	
the	more	realistic	case	where	countries	differ	in	their	beliefs	about	the	threshold.		
We	 show	 that,	 both	 under	 full	 cooperation	 and	 when	 all	 countries	 act	 non-
cooperatively,	 threshold	 concerns	 reduce	 global	 emission	 levels	 relative	 to	 the	
standard	 model,	 even	 though	 it	 does	 not	 necessarily	 increase	 countries’	 welfare,	
either.	We	further	establish	that,	under	some	conditions,	loss	aversion	has	a	similar	
effect	 on	 the	 emission	 levels	 of	 both	 signatories	 and	 non-signatories	 to	 an	 IEA,	
potentially	 leading	 to	 a	 larger	 coalition	 size.	 We	 conclude	 that	 countries	 with	
threshold	 concerns	 are	more	 likely	 to	 take	 significant	 environmental	 decisions	on	
reducing	 their	 emissions,	provided	 that	 their	 governments	 and	delegates	perceive	
that	there	is	a	credible	threat	of	an	approaching	environmental	catastrophe.		
The	 degree	 of	 variation	 among	 the	 beliefs	 held	 by	 different	 countries	 negotiating	
climate	change	abatement	 is	of	course	an	empirical	matter.	Here	we	abstract	 from	
real	 world	 subtleties	 and	 assume,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 tractability,	 either	 symmetric	
behavior	 or	 a	minimalistic	 level	 of	 heterogeneity	with	 either	 high	 or	 low	 level	 of	






estimated	 from	 real-world	 data	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 fruitful	
avenue	for	testing	the	stylized	model	we	have	introduced	here.12	This	appears	to	be	
particularly	salient	at	the	moment,	given	that	a	significant	part	of	the	discussion	in	
the	 2015	 climate	 summit	 in	 Paris	 revolved	 around	 whether	 countries	 should	
collectively	aim	for	a	1.5℃	or	2℃	increase	in	average	global	temperature.	
Recent	literature	has	developed	to	analyze	the	effect	of	increasingly	large	damages	
from	 unabated	 emissions	 on	 climate	 change	 cooperation,	 some	 of	which	we	 have	
briefly	 reviewed	 here.	 We	 have	 added	 to	 it	 by	 introducing	 a	 related	 behavioral	
aspect,	loss	aversion,	a	pervasive	trait	among	humans.	Loss	aversion	is	particularly	
salient	 for	 problems	 such	 as	 climate	 change,	 which	 largely	 pertain	 to	 the	 loss	
domain,	 especially	 when	 contemplating	 the	 damages	 arising	 from	 dangerous	
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Appendix	1:	Proofs	
The	number	of	 signatories	 s	 is	 a	non-negative	 integer	 smaller	 than	 the	number	of	





ii. From	Remark	 2,	we	 have	𝑒! =  𝛽 1−
!"#$
!!!!!!!
. For	𝑒! > 0,	 the	 following	
condition	 should	 hold:	 1+ 𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠)(𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠)− (𝑠 − 2))  >  0 .	 Let	
𝐴(𝑠) = 1+ 𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠)(𝛾𝐿(𝑛 − 𝑠)− (𝑠 − 2)) 	and	 𝑠 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛! 𝐴 𝑠 =
!!!!!!!"
! !!!!
.	For	𝐴 𝑠 > 0	for	any	𝑠,	it	is	sufficient	to	show	that	𝐴 𝑠 > 0.	One	
can	 easily	 find	 that	 𝐴 𝑠 = !!!!(!!!)!
! !!!"




iii. From	 Remark	 2,	 we	 have	𝑒!" = 𝛽 1−
!"#$
!
.	 For	𝑒!" > 0,	 the	 following	
condition	 should	 hold:	 1+ 𝛾𝐿 𝑛 − 𝑠  1− 𝛾𝐿𝑠 + 𝛾𝐿𝑠! >  0 .	 Let	
𝛷 𝑠 = 1+ 𝛾𝐿 𝑛 − 𝑠  1− 𝛾𝐿𝑠 + 𝛾𝐿𝑠! 	and	 𝑠 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛! 𝛷 𝑠 =
!!!"#
! !!!"
.	For	𝛷 𝑠 > 0	for	any	s,	 it	 is	sufficient	to	show	that	𝛷 𝑠 > 0.	One	








𝛷 𝑠 > 0 ,	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 have	 !!!
!!!!
! !!!"

























𝛽𝛾𝐿𝑛 ! 𝑠 − 𝑋
Ψ! = 0.	
For	the	equality	to	hold,	we	need	𝑠 = 𝑋,	thus,	𝑠 = 1+ 𝛾𝐿 𝑛 − 𝑠 .	Solving	for	s	gives,	









> < 0	if	𝑠 > < 𝑋⇔ 𝑠 > < 𝑧!"#.	
iii. Using	the	indirect	welfare	functions,	we	can	write	𝜔!"	in	terms	of	𝜔!:	
𝜔!" = 𝜔! +
!"#$ ! !!! !!!
!!!
.	
It	is	straightforward	to	observe	that	𝜔!" ≶ 𝜔!,	for	𝑠 ≶ 𝑋⇔ 𝑠 ≶ 𝑧!!".	











ii. By	 the	 second	 bullet	 of	 Lemma	 2,	 for	 any	 𝑠 ∈ 𝑧!"# 𝐿′ , 𝑧!!" 𝐿′′ ,	
𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!! 	increases	in	s	since	𝑠 > 𝑧!"# 𝐿′ .	Similarly,	the	second	bullet	
of	Lemma	2	implies	that	𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!!! 	decreases	in	s	since	𝑠 < 𝑧!"# 𝐿′′ .	
For	 any	 other	𝑠 ∉ 𝑧!"# 𝐿′ , 𝑧!"# 𝐿′′ ,	 a	 higher	 environmental	 threshold	
concern	 does	 affect	 how	 the	 number	 of	 signatories	 changes	 the	welfare	 of	
signatories.	 Thus,	 if	 𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!! 	decreases	 (increases),	 𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!!! 	
decreases	(increases)	as	well.	
iii. The	 third	 bullet	 of	 Lemma	 2	 implies	 that	 for	 all	𝑠 ∈ 𝑧!"# 𝐿′ , 𝑧!"# 𝐿′′ ,	
𝜔!" 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!!  > 𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!!, 	and	𝜔!" 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!!! < 𝜔! 𝑠, 𝐿 |!!!,!!!!! .	
Proof	 of	 Proposition	 4:	 Remember	 that	ω! z!"# = 𝜔!" z!"# .	 Let	 us	 define	
z = z!"# + 1	and	let	z′	be	the	smallest	s	such	that	ω! z′ = ω!" z! − 1 .	DS	show,	in	
the	 proof	 of	 Proposition	 3,	 that	z < z! < z+ 1.	 Moreover,	 DS	 prove	 that	 if	z! < 3,	
then	s∗ = 2,	if	z! < 4	then	s∗ = 3,	and	if	z! ≥ 4,	then	s∗ = 4.	By	the	definition	of	z,	we	
can	 write	 the	 condition	 as	z!"# + 1 < z! < z!"# + 2.	 It	 is	 then	 straightforward	 to	




Let	us	assume	𝑛 = 10,	𝛽 = 5/3,	𝛾 = 0.01,	 and	𝐿 = 1+ 𝛼𝜆 ≤ 1.5,	which	guarantees	
the	condition	for	positive	emissions	to	hold:	If	𝛾 < !
! ! (!!!)
⇔ 0.01 < 0.044.	
Figure	4	depicts	the	case	when	governments	do	not	exhibit	concerns	for	dangerous	
climate	change	beyond	a	tipping	point,	𝐿 = 1.	Figure	5	focuses	instead	on	countries	
with	 some	degree	of	 threshold	 concern:	we	set	𝐿 = 1.5	for	visual	 clarity.13	While	𝑇	
does	not	play	any	role	in	Figure	4,	𝑇	is	set	to	be	1	in	Figure	5,	which	places	countries	
in	 the	 loss	 domain. 14 	In	 both	 figures,	 the	 indirect	 welfare	 function	𝜔! 𝑠 	is	
represented	 by	 the	 solid	 curve,	𝜔!" 𝑠 	by	 the	 dotted	 curve,	 and	𝜔!" 𝑠 − 1 	by	 the	
dashed	 curve.	 All	 the	 indirect	 welfare	 functions	 are	 depicted	 against	 the	 size	 of	
coalitions	𝑠,	and	here	the	range	is	restricted	to	the	values	of	interest,	𝑠 = 1,… , 4.	
In	Figure	4,	one	can	observe	that	coalition	size	𝑠∗ = 2	is	 internally	stable,	𝜔! 𝑠∗ ≥
𝜔!" 𝑠∗ − 1 ,	since	the	solid	curve	is	above	the	dashed	curve	at	𝑠 = 2.	Note	also	that	
these	two	curves	intersect	at	𝑠 = 2.976,	so	𝑠 = 3	is	not	 internally	stable.	Moreover,	
coalition	size	𝑠∗ = 2	is	also	externally	stable,	𝜔! 𝑠∗ + 1 ≤ 𝜔!" 𝑠∗ ,	since	the	dotted	




increases	 as	 threshold	 concerns	 are	 introduced	 (or	 concerns	 become	 stronger),	
when	the	environmentally	safe	operating	limits	are	exceeded.	
																																																								
13	In	 this	 numerical	 example,	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 set	𝐿 ≥ 1.02551	for	 the	 coalition	 size	 to	
increase	from	2	to	3.		
14	Remember	 that	𝑇	does	not	affect	 the	emission	 levels,	once	 the	domain	 is	determined.	 It	
does	 levy	 the	welfare	 level,	 but	 in	 equal	measure	 for	 all	 indirect	welfare	 functions	𝜔! 𝑠 ,	








𝒏 = 𝟏𝟎,	𝜷 = 𝟓/𝟑,	𝜸 = 𝟎.𝟎𝟏.		
	
Note:	The	stable	coalition	size	is	𝒔∗ = 𝟑	






































	 	 𝐺𝐿! 𝐸,𝑇 =
𝑇 − 𝐷! 𝐸 , 𝐷! 𝐸 ≤ 𝑇 − 𝜀
𝜆 𝑇 − 𝐷! 𝐸 , 𝐷!(𝐸) > 𝑇 − 𝜀
		 	 	 (2’)	
Similarly,	this	will	modify	equations	(3-5).	Nevertheless,	T	and	𝜀	disappear	once	the	
first	order	condition	taken	and,	thus,	this	modification	does	not	affect	the	solution	of	
the	problem.	
	
